High dropout rates are a problem faced by many microfinance institutions, with borrowers exiting after few loans. The curiosity of dropouts is that, unlike defaulters, they repay their loans. To understand this I investigate differences across borrowers using data from Zimbabwe. I find that negative shocks are a significant predictor of dropout, but not of default, and that social networks are important determinants of on-time repayment. I also find that default more likely is strategic than involuntary. The results support a story in which adverse events lead dropouts to exit, while social networks help these same borrowers avoid default.
Introduction
One of less understood phenomenon regarding microfinance is the high dropout rates faced by many microfinance institutions. A surprisingly large number of borrowers do not maintain their relationships with microfinance institutions (MFIs), leaving after only a few loans. For example, a 2001 survey estimates yearly dropout rates that range from 29% to 66% (MicroBanking Bulletin 2001) 1 . While some dropouts eventually return, the number of clients who do not regularly borrow is strikingly high. Microfinance practitioners recognize this as a serious problem, as it may indicate a failure to meet borrowers' financial needs (Cohen 2002) . Furthermore, the loss of clients makes it more difficult for institutions to recover the costs of initiating the loan contract, dampening profitability (Pawlak and Matul 2004, Urquizo 2006 ).
Microfinance dropout is curious for several reasons. First, borrowers, particularly firms with few assets and little reputation, can benefit from long term relationships with lenders. As banks acquire more information about borrowers and subsequently face lower costs, they can pass on the benefits in the form of larger loans, longer terms, less frequent repayments, and fewer collateral or personal guarantee requirements (Armendariz and Morduch 2010) . Second, for most poor microentrepreneurs the cessation of a microfinance relationship constitutes an exit from formal credit markets altogether, as graduation rates to larger formal lenders tend to be low. Third, and most curiously, dropout rates generally are not matched by high default rates, suggesting the majority of dropouts repay existing loans and remain in good standing with the lender. Thus dropouts are distinct from defaulters. Unlike defaulters, who cut themselves off from additional microfinance loans, dropouts keep the option of future borrowing open. The voluntary nature of this exit raises questions about some of the proposed explanations for dropout, such as borrowers' dissatisfaction with high transaction costs, loan type, loan size, term length, repayment inflexibility, and the use of microfinance for one large purchase (CGAP 2000 , Hulme 1999 , Meyer 2002 , MicroBanking Bulletin 2001 , Pagura 2004 , Wright 1997 . All of these factors can explain why borrowers want to leave, but not why some repay before doing so. From an economic perspective, repayment is rational only if the penalty for default involves credit rationing and if the borrower plans to return. In these circumstances repaying the loan is akin to purchasing an option for access to future loans. Thus in analyzing the determinants of exit, the question is not simply why some borrowers leave, but why some default and others repay before doing so.
This paper attempts to add to the literature on client exit by analyzing the determinants of borrower dropout using panel data from a microfinance lender in Zimbabwe. The data can contribute uniquely to the discussion of borrower behavior for several reasons. First, the MFI in question suffered a high rate of dropout over the two panel period. Fifty two percent of clients in the first survey cease to borrow by the second one, creating a sufficiently large sample of clients who exit. Second, the data set contains detailed information on every loan given to clients in the sample, making it possible to assess delinquency and default. Third, a large number of borrowers who exit do not default, making it possible to assess differences not only between dropouts and continuing clients, but also between dropouts and defaulters.
I begin with a theoretical framework that defines three categories of borrowers--continuing clients, dropouts and defaulters-and the role ability and willingness to maintain microfinance loans play in categorizing each. Dropouts are identified as borrowers who are willing to maintain a microfinance relationship but are unable to do so in one period. This interruption in lending may be due to more periodic credit needs, in which case it is predictable, or due to shocks, in which case it is unanticipated. Defaulters, on other hand, are more difficult to define. They could could be willing but unable to repay, in which case default is involuntary, or able but unwilling to repay, in which case default is strategic. To assess which case dominates I turn to the data.
I next estimate models of continued borrowing, dropout and default as well as repayment delinquency. I find that several variables linked to the ability to repay, including income, wealth, and shocks, are not significant in predicting default or delinquency. Defaulters do not appear worse off at either the household or enterprise level, suggesting default is strategic rather than involuntary.
Meanwhile, I find that dropout likely is involuntary rather than predictable. On most observable enterprise characteristics dropouts do not vary from defaulters or continuing clients, implying enterprise credit needs to not differ dramatically. At the household level, however, dropouts are worse off than continuing clients and are significantly more likely to face a negative shock. This suggests adverse events likely drive the cessation in borrowing.
The results also show that social networks play an important role in determining borrowers' ability to maintain microfinance loans. Membership in non-financial and church groups are among the major predictors of lower repayment delinquency, while membership in a church group is the main predictor of dropout over default. These findings are robust to inclusions of controls for entrepreneurial skill and borrower quality, and support a story in which social networks help microfinance clients avoid default.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for borrowers' decision making. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 estimates the determinants of borrower categories. Section 5 estimates repayment and delinquency. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
The decision making process of microfinance borrowers can be outlined as a three period process.
In the first period all entrepreneurs take a microfinance loan. In the second period entrepreneurs decide whether or not to repay the loan and, if they repay, whether or not to take a second loan. In the third period borrowers who did not default take another loan. Borrowers who repay the first loan and take loans in the second and third periods are called continuing clients. Borrowers who default on the first loan, thereby barring themselves from any future loans, are called defaulters.
Borrowers who repay the first loan, do not borrow in the second period, but return to borrow in the third period are called dropouts.
The definitive period is the second one, as this is when borrowers decide whether or not to repay and whether or not to take a second loan. Borrowers repay if they can acquire the funds and if maintaining access to loans is viewed as worthwhile. They take a second loan if the additional income from the project outweighs the loan payment. The first component of these joint decisions can be categorized as ability; borrowers repay and take a second loan if they can acquire the funds, either from themselves or others, to make loan payments. The second component can be categorized as willingness; borrowers who are able to repay if the cost of default-losing access to future microfinance loans--is larger than the loan repayment. Borrowers are distinguished by the degree to which ability and willingness drive their decisions. Continuing clients are willing and able to maintain a microfinance loan in all three periods. Dropouts are willing to maintain the credit relationship but are unable to do so in the second period. It is unclear if this is due to different projects and more periodic financial needs, in which case dropout is predictable, or due to shocks, in which case it is unanticipated. There also is ambiguity as to how to define defaulters. Defaulters Entrepreneurs who repaid first loan take another loan could be able but unwilling to repay, in which case they strategically default. Alternatively, they could be willing but unable to repay, in which case they involuntarily default. To determine which explanation dominates, I turn to the data.
The Data
The data used in this paper come from an impact evaluation conducted by USAID's AIMS Project . Since the survey was not designed to investigate the phenomena of dropout or default, the reasons for client exit are not included in the data. In the place of exit details, however, the data contain information on every loan taken from Zambuko by survey clients.
I use this information to define borrowers who were clients of Zambuko in the first panel and appear in both years. 4 Borrowers are defined as continuing clients if they have an outstanding loan at the time of the second survey. This includes borrowers who repaid an existing loan and take a new one and borrowers whose current loan has yet to come due. Borrowers are defined as dropouts if they had a Zambuko loan as of the first survey but have not borrowed in more than a year by the second survey. 5 Borrowers are defined as defaulters if the repayment date is more than one month passed, no repayment date is given, and the borrower received no further loans from the institution 6 .
Borrowers who repay more than 90 days after the due date also are defined as defaulters. While these borrowers do not default, the delinquency is such that that they likely are barred from future
loans. An estimated function of delinquency, shown in figure 1, corroborates that defaulters who repay are distinct from the other groups. While sixty five percent of continuing clients and eighty percent of dropouts repay within thirty days of the deadline, no defaulters who repay do so within thirty days and eighty one percent repay more than 120 days after the deadline.
Of the 343 borrowers in the sample, 111 are classified as continuing clients, 137 as defaulters, and 95 as dropouts. The information on loan histories, presented in table 1, suggests that at the initiation of the credit relationship Zambuko did not view dropouts and defaulters as higher credit risks. There is no evidence of less favorable terms, as the size and term length of the first loans are comparable across groups. This assessment quickly changes, however, as defaulters soon reveal themselves to be low quality borrowers. Only thirty six percent pay their first loan on time and twenty one percent default. 7 Among those who repay the average number of days late is one hundred and fifty eight, a delinquency of more than five months. In comparison, dropouts do not appear to be lower quality borrowers. On the last loan they have higher on-time repayment than continuing clients and a comparable number of days late. This suggests they remain in good standing with the institution. . The incidence of borrowing from other formal lenders is low. As of the second survey round only eight percent of continuing clients, six percent of defaulters and three percent of dropouts report borrowing from another formal source. This suggests migration to other formal lenders is low and confirms that ceasing to borrow from Zambuko constitutes an exit from formal credit markets altogether for most borrowers.
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framework, borrowers choose the repayment and borrowing paths that maximize utility, which is a function of observable characteristics ( i X ) and an error term ( ij  ). The probability that borrower i is in category j is the probability that this option yields higher utility than the other ones.
In a multinomial logit model this probability becomes
Covariates
The elements of i X include factors we expect to be related to the ability and willingness to maintain microfinance loans. Ability, for example, depends on household income (which includes enterprise profits), wealth, negative shocks, and access to social networks that can provide funds in the face of a liquidity shock. Willingness depends on entrepreneurs' project types (as credit needs may vary), access to informal finance (the main alternative to microfinance), and non-economic incentives, such as a moral imperative to repay. The last factor is not measurable in the data, but may be influenced by social networks that threaten sanctions in the face of strategic default. Other factors that play an important role and also are unobservable are entrepreneurial skill and borrower quality.
Proxies for both are included as they are important confounding factors, particularly in regard to the social network measures. For example, entrepreneurs known to have low skill or low borrower quality may be shunned from social groups.
Household characteristics included in i X are gender, marital status, the dependency ratio (the ratio of economically active household members to the total), household income per capita, and home ownership. Marital status and the dependency ratio are meant to capture the ability of borrowers to call on resources within the household to make loan repayments in the face of liquidity shocks. Marital status also may capture access to social networks, if spouses confer access to a wider network of family and friends that can called on in times of need. Negative shocks themselves are measured at the household level and are taken from responses regarding adverse events that took place during the previous two years. Listed shocks include illness of the respondent or household member, death of a household member, departure of an income earner or arrival of new household members, asset losses due to fire or theft, and job loss. Shocks that occurred between the two surveys and prior to the first survey are considered.
Enterprise characteristics include firm age, as measured by years in operation (duration), industry, firm size, as measured by employees, and formality. Collectively these are meant to capture differences in project type and the potential for more intermittent credit needs. For example, younger, smaller and informal firms may have different expansion possibilities, while firms in particular industries might have different demand for fixed and working capital. It is worth noting that employees are used rather than assets to measure firm size, as the latter is more likely to be driven by the length of the microfinance relationship.
One of the most important components of i X is social networks, which may influence credit behavior through multiple channels. These include the provision of funds if borrowers face a negative shock (Van Tassel 2004) , the mitigation of information costs and enhanced access to informal lenders (Okten and Osili 2004, Wydick et.al 2011) , and the provision of peer monitoring and sanctions, which increase the costs of default (Karlan 2007 , Van Bastelaer and Leathers 2006 , Cassar and Wydick 2010 . Ideally to measure social networks we would have information on the quantity and quality of informal contacts. This information, however, is not available. In their place I use three variables that likely are highly correlated with informal networks. The first is membership in a church group. The second is membership in another non-financial group, including a business association, women's group, or employee association. The third is membership in an informal savings group, including a ROSCA, savings club or burial society. To ensure these variables are not simply an artifact of entrepreneurial skill and borrower quality I also include proxies for each. To control for skill I use a dummy variable for whether or not the entrepreneur has a sales strategy. I do not include education, as there is a high non-response rate, limiting the size of an already small sample. To control for borrower quality I use access to supplier credit. This is an important source of informal credit for many microenterprises and is less likely to be an option for low quality borrowers. Finally, I include city fixed effects in case repayment problems are specific to particular bank branches.
All variables except for shocks are as of the first survey round. This is to reduce contamination from the length of the microfinance relationship. The variable of greatest concern is assets, since microfinance loans frequently are used to purchase assets for the enterprise or household. Thus in the place of assets, to measure wealth I use home ownership. Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2 . The second to last column shows the results of mean comparison tests for all three groups, while the last column shows results for mean comparisons between defaulters and dropouts only. Asset, profit and income measures have been converted to U.S. dollars for ease of interpretation.
Results
The results from the estimation of the multinomial logit are shown in table 4. The base category is dropouts. The coefficients are average marginal effects, with standard errors shown in parentheses.
Each coefficient therefore represents how a one unit increase in the covariate changes the probability a borrower is a continuing client or defaulter rather than a dropout.
Several conclusions emerge. First, income, wealth and household shocks are significant predictors of dropout, but not of default. As shown in columns one, three and five, continuing clients have higher income, are more likely to own their home, and are less likely to have been hit with a shock than dropouts. It therefore appears that continuing clients have a greater capacity to maintain microfinance loans than dropouts. The same, however, does not appear to be true for dropouts with respect to defaulters. As shown in columns two, four and six, the coefficients on income, home ownership and shocks all are insignificant. At the household level defaulters do not appear worse off, implying that default likely stems from lack of willingness rather than lack of ability.
Second, the majority of enterprise characteristics do not predict either continued borrowing or default relative to dropout. Firm age, size, formality, having a sales strategy, and most of the industry dummies are insignificant. On average defaulters and dropouts do not have enterprises that are younger, smaller or less formal. Only two enterprise characteristics are significant. The first is manufacturing, which is negative and significant for continuing clients. While this may signal that dropouts have more intermittent credit needs, the insignificance of the other enterprise variables weakens this claim. The second variable is access to supplier credit, which is positive and significant for continuing clients but insignificant for defaulters. If supplier credit captures borrower quality, this suggests continuing clients are better borrowers but that defaulters are not necessarily worse ones. This last result is surprising and further suggests defaulters are not shut out of all credit markets. The results also imply the enterprises of dropouts do not differ dramatically from those of continuing clients or defaulters and that the cessation in lending is not due to predictable fluctuations in credit demand.
Third, reduced participation in social networks is the most important predictor of default.
As shown in columns two, four and six, the coefficient on membership in a church group is negative and significant. Defaulters are 25% less likely than dropouts to be members of a church group.
This result is particularly striking given that the model includes controls for entrepreneurial skill and borrower quality, which means this isn't just a statement about either. This suggests social networks play an important role in determining continued microfinance participation.
Overall the results support a story of strategic rather than involuntary default, as defaulters do not appear worse off at either the household or enterprise level. The results also support a story of unanticipated exit on the part of dropouts and the importance of informal networks in allowing these borrowers to maintain formal credit. 10 These conclusions, however, are not definitive, and thus I turn to an analysis of loan repayment to further analyze the determinants of client exit.
Estimating Loan Repayment
To estimate repayment behavior I use two models. The first model estimates the probability borrowers repay on time, defined as paying within 30 days of the due date. 
Conclusions
This paper attempts to add to the understanding of client exit from microfinance using panel data from a lender in Zimbabwe. The results provide evidence that default in the sample is strategic rather than involuntary, as defaulters do not appear worse off at either the household or enterprise level. The results also show that social networks play an important role in determining borrowers' ability to maintain loans. Members of social groups are less likely to default or exhibit payment delinquency and dropouts are more likely to belong to informal groups than defaulters.
Two points are worth making regarding the results. First, they highlight the difficulty in predicting borrower types and behavior based on basic, observable characteristics. This suggests it may be difficult to identify dropouts and defaulters at the beginning of the credit relationship absent a more detailed understanding of how microfinance fits into these borrowers' lives. Second, the generalizability of the findings may be limited, as the high rates of client exit, delinquency and default in the sample raise questions about the degree to which Zambuko Trust is representative of other microfinance institutions. For example, the difficult macroeconomic situation facing
Zimbabwe at the time of the survey may have created repayment difficulties beyond industry norms.
More expansive datasets, once available, will be able to further expand our understanding of microfinance dropout and default. This is important for policymakers, practitioners and researchers seeking to improve the outreach and impact of microfinance products.
Development, 32 ( 7) 2 For details on Zambuko's loans at the time, see Barnes (2001) . While most of the contract terms are standard, the one exception is joint liability in group loans, which was not enforced until 1999.
3 The survey covers a period of increased hardship due to the deterioration of the economy and an aggravation of the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the case of the economy, inflation more than triples over the two year period, increasing from an annual rate of 14.4% in 1997 to 69.7% in 1999. In the case of the HIV/AIDS crisis, by the year 2000 it is estimated that one quarter of all adults aged 15 to 49
were HIV/AIDS infected (Barnes 2001) . 4 This includes 5 members of the control group who begin borrowing after the first survey round but excludes 2 clients who receive subsequent loans despite having no repayment dates.
5 My measure differs from the survey, which defines departing clients as those who have not taken a new loan since 1997.
6 While the absence of a repayment date could stem from surveyor or credit officer error, given the low percentage of missing data for other loan variables I assume this is not the case. This is corroborated by ensuring that defaulters do not receive subsequent loans from Zambuko.
7 The last loan is defined as the last loan taken out for which the repayment date has passed.
Outstanding loans whose repayment dates are beyond the second survey are not considered.
8 Information on informal credit is limited in the data. One reason is because the survey asks about loans used for enterprise purposes and defines a loan as credit where interest is charged and the repayment date fixed. Thus households may not list informal loans used for household purposes or those without explicit interest rates or strict payment schedules. 
